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The role of philosophy in discussions of clinical practice was once
regarded by many as restricted to a very limited version of
‘medical ethics’, one that has been extensively criticized in the
pages of this journal and elsewhere for being at once philosophi-
cally untenable and practically unhelpful [1–4]. While this unin-
spiring view of the nature and scope of applied philosophy has by
no means been eradicated, over a number of years there has been
a resurgence of interest in the philosophy of medicine and health
care as an intellectually serious and practically significant enter-
prise. Controversies about evidence, value, clinical knowledge,
judgement, integrity and ethics have required practitioners and
policy-makers to confront the epistemic and moral basis of prac-
tice, while philosophers have found in these debates ways to invig-
orate and reframe the investigation of long-standing philosophical
problems, about the nature of reasoning, science, knowledge and
practice, and the relationships between epistemology and ethics,
morals and politics [1,5–7].
Applied philosophy has moved a long way from the simplistic
application of ethical theories to artificially constructed ‘dilem-
mas’, to become a rigorous engagement with questions of medical
epistemology, metaphysics, and moral and practical reasoning. The
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice (JECP) has played no
small part in these developments. From its inception, it has consist-
ently raised questions of an underlying, conceptual nature that all
manner of influential commentators either ignored or openly dis-
missed in pronouncing on how to improve the organization of health
services, the ethics of practitioners, the reasoning of clinicians and
a host of other issues central to the delivery of health care.
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Those influential authors insisted that there were no significant
philosophical or methodological problems with importing con-
cepts from the worlds of commerce and ‘management science’ into
health systems [8–11]. From their perspective, the only really
interesting and practically relevant questions concerned how to
‘advance’ this project in the context of such ‘change resistant’
environments as the British National Health Service [11].
However, the JECP gave voice to those who questioned the mean-
ingfulness and value of applying concepts such as ‘audit’ and
‘organisational quality’ (as derived from business and manage-
ment theories) to complex health systems and practices [12–15]. In
doing so, it fulfilled the proper goal of an academic publication, in
resisting what we have previously called ‘moderate anti-
intellectualism’ [1]: the view that the practical mind is properly
employed in considering thoughtfully questions about ‘how to’
apply currently fashionable or pervasive ideas and approaches, but
not in considering questions about why – or whether – one should
wish to adopt these approaches, or in subjecting their underlying
ideas and assumptions to rigorous critical scrutiny. We regard the
rejection of this view as both definitive of a philosophical outlook
and – in accord with John Stuart Mill [16] and George Bernard
Shaw [17], respectively – as a necessary precondition for both
freedom and progress [1,5].
Similarly, even as the authors of policy documents and ‘practi-
cal ethics’ texts have proceeded as though there were no unre-
solved questions worth mentioning about ‘ethics and values’ in
health care, or as though the resolution of such questions was a
straightforward, empirical matter [18–20], contributors to the
JECP have exposed a lack of consensus beyond the platitudinous
on some of the most pressing questions about the nature and value
of health and health care [4,6]. These questions include the role of
value judgements in clinical diagnosis [21,22], the role of virtue in
medical training and practice [5,6], and the role of normative
thinking in the definition of health and illness [23,24]. The impli-
cation, again, is that we need to do more rigorous philosophical
thinking, not less, if we are to have anything to say that is at once
substantive (going beyond platitudes) and defensible (justifiable in
principle to other reasonable people). More thought is required, if
we are even to understand the nature of our disagreements, let
alone find realistic ways to resolve them [6].
But by far the most significant contribution of the JECP has
been to the debate about evidence-based medicine (EBM). Again,
resisting from the outset the temptation to treat underlying ques-
tions – about the nature of scientific evidence and its relationship
with other ‘warrants’ for clinical decision making – as either
settled already or a distraction from the truly ‘practical’ project of
making all practice ‘evidence-based’, the journal initiated a genu-
inely critical debate that has transformed our understanding of the
relationship between evidence, reasoning and practice. From its
early expressions of concern about the limitations of probabilistic
reasoning [25] and the rhetorical abuses of the term ‘evidence’ by
leading figures in the EBM movement [26], the journal soon
became a major forum for exploring the multiplicity of questions
raised by EBM, questions as diverse as: the nature and dimensions
of evidence, the epistemology and ontology of causality [27–29];
the relationship between knowledge production and economic and
political factors (and the sceptical questions these relationships
raise concerning the ‘base’ research evidence provides for sound
practice) [30–32]; the role of context-specific knowledge in clini-
cal reasoning [21,25,33]; the logic of probabilistic and scientific
reasoning [34–38]; the relationship between factual and evaluative
reasoning [22–24]; and the need to understand the personal and
experiential features of the clinical encounter from the perspec-
tives of both the practitioner and the patient [7,21,39–45]. To do
justice to all of these issues, the journal set up a series of special
‘EBM thematic’ editions [30,40,46–51]. The repeated identifica-
tion, in editorials of the ‘EBM thematics’ over several years, of
factors EBM’s account of sound clinical practice failed to address,
logically invited the establishment of a vehicle to address these
factors directly. Since 2010, the annual philosophy of medicine
thematic issues [1,5–7] have been central to this intellectual under-
taking, and to asserting the autonomy of the philosophy of medi-
cine as an academic field worthy of serious pursuit.
These Philosophy Thematic editions have substantially
advanced the debate on all of the above issues, developing argu-
ments about virtue epistemology, person-centred care and more
broadly extending the ways in which philosophical enquiry can
make a substantive contribution to resolving issues of concern in
clinical practice. While by no means a full representation of the
range of ideas and arguments covered in the thematic editions to
date, the articles selected for publication in this philosophy section
of the commemorative twentieth anniversary edition of the journal
represent some of the key movements in the central debates that
have dominated our pages [52–69].
After EBM: explanation, diagnosis,
causality and decision making
We open the section with a series of articles that appraise the
current state of EBM, its limitations and prospects for its future
development, beginning with a paper that very much vindicates the
concerns raised in earlier editions of the JECP [30–32] about the
role of political and economic factors in shaping the research
agenda [52]. Susanna Every-Palmer and Jeremy Howick argue that
the aims of EBM have been undermined by (mostly industry-
funded) researchers, who have engaged in selective publication
and the deliberate manipulation of research methods. In order to
save EBM from the worst aspects of this problem, the authors offer
a provocative suggestion: adjust the ranking of industry-funded
research to reflect greater scepticism about the trustworthiness of
its results. This proposal would be a quick fix for the immediate
problem, but should also generate careful reflection on just how far
we are from a state of ideal clinical research.
Alexander Mebius wants to move criticism of EBM away from
the typical focus on the methodological limits of randomized trials
and the hierarchy of evidence [53]. He follows Tonelli [21] and
others in arguing for a plurality of methods utilized for corrobo-
rating medical claims, suggesting that the strength of the evidential
warrant lies in the evidence itself, rather than the methodology
used to garner that evidence.
Benjamin Chin-Yee addresses the importance of the
underdetermination of theory by evidence (the Duhem–Quine
thesis) for the philosophy of medicine [54]. This is an important
set of arguments from the philosophy of science that, aside from a
paper by Sehon and Stanley [70], has not engendered much atten-
tion in the EBM debate. Chin-Yee provides a careful exposition of
the thesis and then skilfully shows its application with respect to
the tensions between explanations by clinical trials and physio-
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logical mechanisms. Using the example of the chemotherapeutic
agent imatinib, Chin-Yee shows how the hierarchy of evidence as
articulated by EBM exacerbates the underdetermination of theory
by evidence and proposes a pluralistic epistemology as a partial
solution to this problem.
The nature and value of explanatory diagnoses and explanatory
pluralism are also key preoccupations of the paper by Michael
Cournoyea and Ashley Kennedy [55]. These authors propose a
methodology for investigating medically unexplained physical
symptoms (MUPS). Currently, MUPS are diagnosed via non-
explanatory labels. Yet even when mechanistic explanations
remain out of reach, Cournoyea and Kennedy argue that explana-
tory diagnoses should be pursued. Such diagnoses are preferable to
non-explanatory syndromic diagnoses because they bring both
epistemic and therapeutic benefits to patients and their providers.
They therefore advocate a methodology of causal explanatory
pluralism in the diagnosis of MUPS.
This short subsection concludes with a paper that emphasizes
the uniqueness of individual cases, stressing the limitations of
aggregate-based reasoning and calling for a much broader range of
factors to be incorporated into clinical thinking and decision
making. It is fitting that the subsection concludes with a paper by
an author who raised some of the earliest alarms about the use of
statistical aggregates to inform conclusions about the treatment of
specific patients, in the first volume of the journal, 20 years ago
[25]. Sandra Tanenbaum [56] reviews the history and prominent
defences of the statistical aggregate in medicine, concluding that
its principle masters are not only epistemic but also political. Thus,
if the ‘knowledge of particulars’ needed to help cross the gap
between aggregates and individuals is to be seen as epistemically
legitimate, it must be politically legitimated through educational
and quality assurance initiatives that recognize its importance.
This discussion sets the scene for a series of essays exploring the
human and social aspects of care.
Experience, caring, community and
humanity: philosophy at the bedside
At a time when authors writing under the label of ‘real’ EBM
endorse the criticisms made in the JECP over so many years [71],
it is particularly appropriate to look in detail at the factors that
earlier exponents either overlooked or treated as aspects of the
clinical encounter to be ‘integrated’ into EBM at a later stage. As
the exponents of ‘real’ EBM clearly agree, the time for an intel-
lectually serious effort to integrate these human, social and experi-
ential factors into a more comprehensive account of clinical
practice is very much upon us. Many clinicians may ask, aside
from ethics, what business does philosophy have at the bedside?
Even if many practitioners are not sensitized to the numerous
conceptual and epistemological issues that arise in clinical care,
these issues are no less pressing. Many of the papers in this volume
speak to the need to reconsider and renew the conceptual structure
of medicine.
Henrik Vogt and his colleagues support the development of an
organismic, whole-oriented systems medicine for its potential to
help reinstate the person in medical care [57]. At the same time,
they draw insightful attention to constraints on its potential within
primary care to close the gap between scientific and humanistic
constructions of patients, and their health problems, in all their
complexity. The authors note that within the field of systems
medicine, the most humanistic theory focuses on patients as inte-
grative sites and processes of activity at all levels and scales.
However, they question whether any philosophy of systems medi-
cine can yet yield a fully personalizing science able to feed into
humanistic medicine. Sceptical that systems medicine can become
a complete foundation for clinical understanding and practice by
accommodating humanistic concepts of experience, meaning and
value, they argue for the need to complement systems medicine
with the use of other methods.
Victor Cellarius and Ross Upshur argue that the current demo-
graphic transition, typified in high income settings by an ageing
population and more concurrent chronic illnesses, necessitates a
reconsideration of medical care in the late life course [58]. It has
taken decades for palliative care to be accepted as an integrated
component of modern medicine, but the sharp demarcation of
what sort of patient qualifies for palliation has been blurred.
Cellarius and Upshur articulate the concept of teleological care,
that is, medicine that is focused on reasoning about telos (i.e. end)
in three senses: (1) the end of life as a temporal limit; (2) the end
of life as the individual’s purpose and meaning; and (3) the end of
life as the meaning of life as a whole. Integrating these strands
would result in a mode of emphasis of care away from specializa-
tion and embracing a robust generalism.
Stephen Buetow’s paper shifts the focus again, emphasizing the
relational aspects of care and the moral agency of the patient as a
person [59]. He makes the important claim that most patients need
to, and can, care about clinicians. Such caring supports the well-
being and personhood of the clinician on whose care the patient
depends. It contributes thereby to a repersonalization of health
care amid a crisis of loss of compassion, reflected not only in the
ways that clinicians’ actions can dehumanize patients but also in
rising complaints by patients. Against this backdrop, Buetow sug-
gests how patients can care about a clinician even when the clini-
cian appears uncaring. Drawing on the philosophy and psychology
of Hans Vaihinger’s ‘as if’ theory, Buetow’s approach requires the
patient to imagine and act as if the apparently uncaring clinician is
caring – so long as the uncaring is minor and uncertain to the
patient. Use of the approach may require clinicians to remind
patients in such circumstances to give them the benefit of the
doubt. Testing this approach against his experience as a patient,
Buetow finds it both ‘relationship-protecting’ and useful in
rendering uncertainty (often treated as a negative in health care)
productive.
Shawn Whatley argues that clinical medicine must work with
scholars in the humanities to develop its own ‘sui generis’ philoso-
phy of medicine [60]. Whatley notes that medical education is
predominated by a reductive form of physicalism, and despite
efforts to bring a biopsychosocial frame to understanding health
and disease, medical students by and large accept a metaphysic of
physicalism. For Whatley, remedying this is a central challenge for
both the philosophy of medicine and medical education.
Ignaas Devisch and Stijn Vanheule draw on the work of the
French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy in their discussion of
autonomy and paternalism in clinical medicine [61]. Nancy argues
that there is strictly no such thing as autonomy, because the indi-
vidual develops a sense of identity or self heteronomously, in the
context of a broader community on the basis of input from external
sources, including other individuals. The authors use this as a basis
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from which to argue that developments in medical technology,
with its inherently ‘intruding’ nature, make it urgent that we
rethink the ideas of autonomy and selfhood and their importance in
medicine.
From experience of serious illness as a patient – his own experi-
ence and that recounted by Havi Carel in her book, Illness [72] –
former Health Service manager and philosopher Derek Mitchell
further suggests what is needed to rehumanize modern health care
[62]. Looking beyond systems and procedures, beyond biological
and normative conceptions of illness, Mitchell focuses on how real
improvements in patient care depend, at the bedside, on the virtu-
ous practitioner. In action, this moral agent is responsive both
situationally to the complexity of the health setting and relationally
to the unique lived experience of the patient; the patient as a person
whose being is disrupted by illness and exposed to the practitioner,
for example, through narrative. Mitchell argues for improving the
stories that patients tell rather than the measures against which
practitioners are judged.
Referring to the definition of mental disorder in the fifth Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), Stijn
Vanheule and Ignaas Devisch [63] note that mental disorders are
usually associated with significant distress. However, the hand-
book is vague with respect to whether distress is crucial to the
diagnosis of mental disorders, and a conceptual framework on the
precise nature of distress is lacking. As a result, it remains vague
how the term ‘distress’ is to be taken into account in actual diag-
nostic situations: DSM-5 provides no operational framework for
diagnosing distress. Using the work of Georges Canguilhem on
abnormality and pathology, and Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical
work on mental suffering, the authors aim to provide a structure for
conceptualizing and evaluating distress. According to Ricoeur’s
phenomenological model, distress is not a quantity that can be
measured, but a characteristic that should be studied qualitatively
in interpersonal and narrative contexts: diagnosticians should
describe and document how individuals experience subjective dis-
tress. On a practical level, this means that clinicians’ ideas about
patients’ distress should be embedded in case formulations. A
detailed evaluation of an individual’s pathos experience should be
made before conclusions are drawn with regard to diagnosis.
This issue obviously has implications for understanding distress
that go beyond the important issue of its role in DSM-5, and the
paper is a fine illustration of the unavoidable nature of philosophi-
cal reflection if we are to find an adequate basis for practice.
Debates
As we noted, a great virtue of philosophy is its ability to cut
through superficial appearances of consensus and to remind us that
certain problems of a pressing and fundamental nature have not
been resolved. Even when particular ideas and approaches have
become dominant, critical reflection can enable us to see that they
are by no means necessary, and such thinking can sometimes be an
essential prerequisite of progress in a given area [5]. One of the
great achievements of the JECP and its thematic editions has been
in provoking debate about fundamentals – something we celebrate
by unapologetically continuing the fundamental debates about
causal ontology and about foundationalism in medicine that were
raised and not resolved in previous issues.
In a previous Philosophy Thematic issue, Roger Kerry and
colleagues [29] argued that EBM should adopt a dispositionalist
metaphysics of causation. In this issue, Anders Strand and Veli-
Pekka Parkkinen [64] champion an alternative, difference-making
account of causality, which had been rejected by Kerry et al.
Strand and Parkkinen contend that discussions of causality in
medicine should focus on epistemological, rather than ontological,
issues, and they argue that a difference-making approach to cau-
sality better supports inferences from research evidence to clinical
decisions. In a reply to this paper, Kerry et al. [65] argue that their
dispositionalist approach does ground clinical reasoning and,
further, they claim that there is a good reason for philosophy of
medicine to address ontological as well as epistemological ques-
tions about causation.
Ross Upshur [66] responds to Miles Little’s essay from the
previous thematic issue [73]. Little sought to defend what he terms
a ‘modest foundationalism’. While sympathetic to Little’s argu-
ments, Upshur argues that the notion of foundations, even modest,
is incoherent. It is unclear why medicine needs a singular base or
centre and the motivation for seeking one is also not well articu-
lated. Upshur argues for a pragmatic fallibilism as the orienting
epistemology for medicine.
Conference reports
We include two conference reports providing an overview of some
of the active topics in the philosophy of medicine. Maël Lemoine
and colleagues [67] report on the first biennial meeting of the
International Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of Medicine
(IASPM). The IASPM was initiated by five research centres: the
Centre for Humanities and Health at King’s College (London,
UK), the Institut für Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin at
Johannes Gutenberg (Mainz, Germany), the European School of
Molecular Medicine (Milan, Italy), the IHPST at Panthéon-
Sorbonne (Paris, France) and the Department of History and Phi-
losophy of Science at Pittsburgh (USA). The mission of the
meeting was to contribute to the consolidation of the philosophy of
medicine as a field by bringing together junior researchers and
senior academics for a 3-day conference exploring current and
future directions in the field.
Emma Bullock and Elselijn Kingma [68] report on the fifth in a
series of 1-day workshops organized by the Centre for Humanities
and Health at King’s College London. The goal of the workshops
is to provide a new model for high-quality, open interdisciplinary
engagement between medical professionals and philosophers, and
under the broad heading of ‘Medical Knowledge, Medical Duties’,
the invited audience of professionals and academics debated
current controversies concerning public and private goods, exper-
tise and obligation, EBM and person-centered medicine, particu-
larism and judgement.
Book review
We conclude with a review of Alex Broadbent’s new monograph
Philosophy of Epidemiology from Jonathan Fuller [69]. Broadbent
boldly opens up the philosophy of epidemiology as a new sub-
discipline in the philosophy of medicine and the philosophy of
science. His book carefully and articulately addresses important,
often unchartered problems that are relevant to philosophers and
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epidemiologists alike, including the readership of the JECP, and
particularly readers of the Philosophy Thematic editions.
Conclusion
The political and social evolution of health care has been rapid and
dramatic, especially over the last 20 years. The growth of the
philosophy of medicine and its expansion into new areas of inquiry
has kept up. Through the first five philosophy of medicine
thematics of the journal, including the present edition, progress
has been made in clarifying the ethical, epistemic and methodo-
logical health care problems of our time, scrutinizing dominant
beliefs and practices, and rigorously defending alternative views.
This is philosophy – but philosophy applied to the real concerns of
health care providers and patients, philosophy concerned with
evaluating clinical practice. We hope that future issues continue to
foster discussion and collaboration between philosophers, clini-
cians and clinical researchers, and we look forward to the next 20
years of growth, progress and scholarship.
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